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FROM THE GROUP OF TWENTY TO THE 
GROUP OF TWO: 
THE NEED FOR HARMONIZING 
DERIVATIVES REGULATION BETWEEN 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
TESSA WHITE* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the approval of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank) in July of 2010, U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Commissioner Bart Chilton wrote, “Now 
that the U.S. has approved the largest financial regulatory reform ever 
undertaken, it’s time for other nations to join in to ensure more efficient, 
effective market systems. Here is what we know: free markets without sufficient 
sideboards led to the global economic collapse.”1 Chilton began his position at 
the CFTC in 2007, making him a firsthand witness to the financial crisis and the 
subsequent rulemaking that ultimately resulted in Dodd–Frank.2 
Throughout his time at the Commission, Chilton consistently championed 
the need for cooperation among different nations’ regulatory agencies.3 The 
legislation itself stresses this need for international regulatory cooperation, with 
§ 752 of Dodd–Frank specifically addressing international harmonization of 
derivatives reform: “In order to promote effective and consistent global 
regulation of contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery and options 
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 1.  Bart Chilton, The Heavy Lift of Harmonization—CFTC’s Chilton, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2010), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2010/09/24/opinion-the-heavy-lift-of-harmonization-
cftcs-chilton/.  
 2.  Gina Chon, Financial Reform Effort Disappoints Former CFTC Regulator, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Mar. 23, 2014, 5:24PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/26913de2-b10a-11e3-bbd4-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2xaDN8J8S.  
 3.  See, e.g., Chilton, supra note 1 (“Such communication between regulators at the international 
level is critically important in the brave new world of global electronic markets.”). 
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on such contracts, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall consult 
and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on the establishment of 
consistent international standards.”4 Moreover, the U.S. push for regulatory 
cooperation in the financial realm did not stop with this legislation. In fact, 
President Obama issued Executive Order 13,609 in 2012, specifically directing 
agencies to focus on international regulatory cooperation in order to minimize 
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.5 This executive order acts 
as an additional legitimizing authority on the ability of agencies to cooperate 
with their foreign counterparts and highlights the top priority given to achieving 
global regulatory harmonization in the financial sector.6 
This calling for greater cooperation among regulators has become 
increasingly common in the past twenty years,7 with the financial crisis of 2008 
only escalating the momentum of international regulatory cooperation. In 2002, 
Professor Kal Raustiala highlighted the growing need for communication 
between regulators, writing that “[i]nterdependence among states—the linkages 
between national economies and societies—has never been higher.”8 The crisis, 
therefore, merely amplified awareness of this financial interconnectedness. In a 
recent report on international financial reforms, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) stressed the consequences of a linked global 
economy: 
Cross-border interconnections in the financial markets and other factors helped 
spread disruptions in the global financial system during the 2007–2009 financial crisis 
and increased systemic risk at the national and international levels. For example, the 
rise in the complexity and globalization of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
contributed to economic growth but created interconnections that helped spread 
disruptions quickly across markets and borders during the crisis.9 
As specifically identified in this GAO report, derivatives played a central 
role in the financial crisis and were consequently a central focus of national 
regulatory bodies in the aftermath. Because of their global nature, however, it 
 
 4.  15 U.S.C. § 8325(b) (2014).  
 5.  Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26413 (May 4, 2012) (“In some cases, the differences 
between the regulatory approaches of U.S. agencies and those of their foreign counterparts might not 
be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete 
internationally.”).  
 6.  Reeve T. Bull, Developing a Domestic Framework for International Regulatory Cooperation, 
78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015, at 50 (explaining the significance of President Obama’s 
executive order: “EO 13,609 thus places a high priority upon a cross-border issue that many agencies 
had largely neglected insofar as it was viewed as outside the ambit of their overall regulatory 
missions.”). 
 7.  Jonathan Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory Cooperation: 
TTIP as a Learning Process toward a Global Regulatory Policy, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 
2015, at 107 (“The trend toward international cooperation among regulators has become a significant 
feature of regulatory policy in recent years.”). 
 8.  Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks 
and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2002). 
 9.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-261, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORMS: 
U.S. AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT REFORMS ii (2014), 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-261?source=ra (hereinafter GAO REPORT). 
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quickly became clear that successful regulation of these financial products and 
prevention of future systemic risk required improved, extensive international 
cooperation. Already existing international organizations, such as the Group of 
Twenty (G20) and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA), took immediate action to respond to the crisis. The most notable 
response came from the G20, which has as its objective the coordination of 
policy among its members.10 
The standards- and principles-based regulations set forth by these 
organizations, however, require state implementation by specific governmental 
agencies, and it is in this implementation process that the need for regulatory 
cooperation is critical for a successful global regulatory regime of derivatives. 
Despite being a champion of global regulatory cooperation, Chilton’s statement 
above highlights the largely unilateral approach taken by the United States in 
response to the 2008 financial crisis in passing Dodd–Frank, with U.S. 
policymakers expecting other nations to follow in its regulatory path. Timothy 
Geithner, former Secretary of the Treasury, highlighted this point in his 
remarks at the International Monetary Conference in 2011, stating that “[t]he 
United States has taken an important leadership role in comprehensive reform 
of the over-the-counter derivatives market. Alignment with Europe and Asia is 
essential.”11 Despite the United States’ history of success through unilateral 
action,12 the regulation of derivatives is not an area in which acting alone will 
ultimately lead to a desirable result. 
This need for increased regulatory cooperation is quickly becoming 
apparent with the 2012 passage of the European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation (EMIR). “Europe’s contribution to the centralized reporting, 
clearing, and enhanced transparency requirements demanded post-crash” that 
“apes the US Dodd–Frank rules in many aspects,” yet leaves “some regional 
differences still obfuscating the long-desired global harmony and opening up 
the possibility of regulatory arbitrage.”13 Although both Dodd–Frank and 
EMIR are based upon the same principles set forth by the G20 and both 
attempt to achieve the same goals, the slight differences in regulation between 
 
 10.  Id. at 6 (“The G20’s objectives are to coordinate policy among its members to achieve global 
economic stability and sustainable growth; promote financial regulations that reduce risks and prevent 
future financial crises; and modernize the international financial architecture.”).  
 11.  Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks to the International Monetary 
Conference (June 6, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1202.aspx. 
 12.  Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: 
Governance without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 267 (2005).  
[The] United States is best known for applying its law “extraterritorially” in a unilateral 
manner, from the Helms–Burton Act regarding investments in Cuba, to the sanctions applied 
in response to European assistance for the Soviet oil pipelines, to the application of U.S. 
securities and antitrust law to conduct abroad, as in the Hartford Fire Insurance case. The 
United States has typically applied its law without engaging in any collaboration or 
coordination whatsoever.  
 13.  Dan Barnes, Feature: EMIR Financial Markets Regulation Unfolds, BOBSGUIDE (Mar. 3, 
2014), http://www.bobsguide.com/guide/news/2014/Mar/3/feature-emir-financial-markets-regulation-
unfolds.html.  
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the United States and the European Union create gaps in regulation that 
market participants can take advantage of. As Weadon notes, “[t]he unintended 
consequences of this uneven regulatory playing field include the concentration 
of derivatives risk in the most hospitable jurisdictions and a competitive 
disadvantage for U.S. financial firms. These risks are even more pronounced 
when one considers that OTC derivatives activity is truly global in nature.”14 
Despite the success of the G20 in quickly responding to the 2008 financial 
crisis, identifying important concerns raised by derivatives, and setting forth a 
framework for improving the regulation of derivatives, this note argues that the 
key to regulating derivatives and preventing a similar crisis in the future is the 
harmonization of derivatives regulation through effective transgovernmental 
networks, the most significant of which is that between the United States and 
the European Union. Without such harmonization, governments incentivize 
regulatory arbitrage that can result in the concentration of risk in jurisdictions 
with more favorable or weaker legislation. 
Part II provides a description of transgovernmentalism and explains the 
relevance of this theory in regulating derivatives, noting specific attributes of 
the derivatives market that sets it apart from other areas, such as securities 
regulation, and makes it a sector requiring agency-to-agency communication 
and cooperation. Part III provides a background on the global nature of the 
2008 financial crisis and the response by the international community to the 
risks posed by derivatives. Although part III notes the success of certain global 
efforts, part IV uses the current gaps and inconsistencies between the United 
States’ and the European Union’s regulation of derivatives to highlight the 
critical need for regulatory cooperation and the strengthening of 
transgovernmental networks. Part V discusses the consequences of a derivatives 
regulatory regime that is not harmonized between the United States and the 
European Union, paying particular attention to the risk of regulatory arbitrage 
and the resulting concentration of risk. Notwithstanding the serious 
consequences of failing to harmonize derivatives regulation, part VI 
acknowledges the challenges and impediments to regulatory cooperation and a 
harmonized regulatory regime; however, part VI concludes by noting the 
agreement between the United States and the European Union to overcome 
these impediments, focusing particularly on the current progress of the two 
regimes in improving cooperation between their regulatory bodies. Finally, part 
VII discusses common criticisms of harmonization and the merits of these 
arguments, stressing that critiques of harmonization can be used by regulators 
to avoid some of its pitfalls. 
 
 
 
 14.  Benjamin M. Weadon, International Regulatory Arbitrage Resulting From Dodd–Frank 
Derivatives Regulation, 16. N.C. BANK. INST. 249, 259 (2012).  
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II 
BECAUSE DODD–FRANK SAID SO: ACHIEVING INTERNATIONAL 
HARMONIZATION OF DERIVATIVES REGULATION THROUGH 
TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS 
In a 2014 symposium at the New York University School of Law,15 a group 
of practitioners and academics came together to present and discuss new 
approaches to international regulatory cooperation in anticipation of this 2015 
issue of Law and Contemporary Problems.16 Ten years prior, many of these 
same individuals contributed to the journal’s issue on the emergence of global 
administrative law,17 which was then an emerging field of legal theory and 
practice. In this earlier symposium, authors discussed the global administrative 
space, which includes “international institutions and transnational networks 
involving both governmental and non-governmental actors, as well as domestic 
administrative bodies that operate within international regimes or cause 
transboundary regulatory effects.”18 Although Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye 
set the groundwork of transgovernmentalism in the 1970s,19 the 2005 symposium 
laid a solid foundation for the increasing attention to regulatory cooperation 
across borders, and ten years later, the prevalence and support of global 
administrative law and transnational regulatory networks has only grown.20 
Raustiala highlights this trend, noting, 
[M]uch contemporary international cooperation is not inter-national at all, rather, it is 
occurring among discrete, specialized agencies of governments. . . . These constituent 
parts—especially regulatory agencies tasked with elaborating upon and enforcing the 
laws that manage complex societies—are increasingly networking with their 
counterparts abroad. In the process they are sharing information, ideas, resources, and 
policies. Much of this agency-to-agency cooperation addresses domestic laws that, in a 
globalizing world, have growing international salience.
21
 
Although this area of study and practice now plays an increasingly central 
role in discussions of reform among international organizations and within 
national regulatory bodies, the various methods of undertaking regulatory 
 
 15.  Symposium on New Approaches to International Regulatory Cooperation, New York 
University School of Law, Feb. 27–28 2014. 
16.    Richard Stewart, C. Boyden Gray, Jonathan Wiener, Alberto Alemanno, Robert Ahdieh, 
Jeffrey Dunoff, David Zaring, Reeve Bull, Fernanda Nicola, Mariana Mora Prado, Francesca Bignami, 
and Neysun Mahboubi.  
 17.  See generally Symposium, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1 (2005).   
 18.  Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword: Global Governance as Administration—National and 
Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3 (2005). 
 19.  Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International 
Organizations, 27 WORLD. POL. 39, 43 (1974) (introducing the theory of transgovernmentalism and 
defining transgovernmental relations as “sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different 
governments that are not controlled by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those 
governments”).  
 20.  Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Cooperation and Competition: The Search for Virtues, in 
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 167, 
202 (George A. Bermann et al., eds., 2001). 
 21.  Raustiala, supra note 8, at 3–4.  
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cooperation and contexts in which it arises have resulted in some 
misunderstandings. Reeve Bull and Adam Schlosser note this confusion 
surrounding regulatory cooperation in the trade and regulatory context, writing, 
“[d]espite the widespread support for greater regulatory cooperation, however, 
some confusion exists as to what calling for enhanced cooperation means,” 
specifically highlighting that “regulatory cooperation is not a synonym for 
‘harmonization.’ Harmonization, merely one of many activities that can be 
classified as regulatory cooperation, involves the creation of an identical 
regulation or standard across two jurisdictions.”22 Harmonization also 
encompasses other forms such as mutual recognition of regulations across 
borders, information exchange, and regulatory convergence. 
This distinction between harmonization and regulatory cooperation is 
significant, especially in regard to the regulation of derivatives. As discussed 
above, Dodd–Frank § 752, titled International Harmonization, calls for the 
more attenuated form of regulatory cooperation, “specifically requir[ing] the 
SEC, the CFTC, and the prudential regulators to consult and coordinate with 
foreign regulatory authorities on the establishment of consistent international 
standards”23 with respect to the regulation of OTC derivatives in order to 
promote consistent global regulation. Although this harmonization of 
regulation—in which standards must closely align and achieve consistency 
between different regulatory bodies—is not a viable, nor preferable, option in 
many areas,24 in the regulation of derivatives, harmonization is necessary in 
order to effectively eliminate the systemic risk that accompanies that market. 
The three main reasons for the rise of transgovernmental networks 
demonstrate the networks’ particular relevance to derivatives regulation: (1) 
technological innovation, (2) the expansion of the regulatory state, and (3) 
globalization (economic interdependence).25 The risk posed by derivatives stems 
from the technological innovation behind the creation of new financial 
products, which are significantly complex and resultantly make regulation 
extremely difficult. Moreover, the systemic nature of the risk created by 
derivatives is the result of an increasingly global economy, which again can be 
attributed partially to technology; as Chilton stresses, “[o]ne of the reasons our 
financial markets and our economies are so interconnected—and we need some 
harmonization—is because of technology.”26 
 
 22.  Adam C. Schlosser & Reeve T. Bull, Regulatory Cooperation in the TTIP, REGBLOG (Aug. 
27, 2013), http://www.regblog.org/2013/08/27/27-schlosser-reeve-ttip/.  
 23.  Financial Regulatory Reform: The International Context: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 112th Cong. 18 (June 16, 2011) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm’n) 
(speaking on the international implications of the Dodd–Frank Act, specifically regarding the 
regulation of OTC derivatives and foreign investor adviser registration). 
 24.  See Schlosser & Bull, supra note 22 (noting harmonization “may make sense in select cases 
and sectors, but is frequently not desirable or even possible in many others”). 
 25.  See Raustiala, supra note 8, at 12–13 (describing the three key factors, saying that 
“[t]echnological innovation is thus one major factor behind the rise of networks. A second is the rise of 
the regulatory state itself”).  
 26.  Bart Chilton, Comm’r, Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC: Stopping 
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Due to the increasing emphasis on the regulatory state, the response to the 
financial crisis and the threat presented by derivatives was to bring these 
products under increased regulation and scrutiny, which requires extensive 
regulatory cooperation globally.27 The CFTC’s approach to the regulation of 
derivatives must strive for international harmonization and closely align with 
the actions of regulatory bodies in other jurisdictions, using transgovernmental 
networks to produce a regulatory regime of derivatives that will not allow for 
regulatory arbitrage or foster a concentration of risk due to gaps in regulation. 
III 
THE GLOBAL NATURE OF THE CRISIS, DERIVATIVES, AND REFORM: LIMITS 
OF THE G20 IN THE REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES AND THE NEED FOR 
TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS 
The 2008 financial crisis highlighted both the interconnectedness of the 
various major economies and the derivatives market in particular, and the 
consequences of allowing these contracts to go largely unregulated globally.28 
Although scholars and professionals debate whether derivatives played the 
primary role in the financial crisis, they widely agree that derivatives did cause 
significant damage and remain a source of risk. The Atlantic Council highlights 
this risk in its 2013 report on transatlantic reform, noting, “From the AIG crisis 
to JPMorgan’s $6 billion loss in its ‘London Whale’ trades, OTC derivatives 
have shown themselves to be quick and active transmitters of risk contagion 
between jurisdictions.”29 
In addition to demonstrating the systemic risk posed by derivatives, the 
global nature of the crisis demonstrated the lack of coordination among states 
to even identify such risk. As Duke University School of Law Professor Steven 
Schwarcz notes, 
The 2008 financial crisis also involved a failure to see system-wide correlations—not 
only the tight interconnectedness among banks and non-bank financial firms but also 
the tight interconnectedness between financial firms and markets. What made the 
 
Stammering—Overcoming Obstacles in Financial Regulatory Reform, in COMPENDIUM (Mar. 29, 2011), 
http://commoditymkts.wordpress.com/2011/03/29/cftc-stopping-stammering-overcoming-obstacles-in-
financial-regulatory-reform-commissioner-bart-chilton/#more-1393.  
 27.  Former Secretary Geithner stressed the need for a global approach and reiterated Dodd–
Frank’s mandate of transgovernmentalism, stating, 
The regulators are independent agencies, with independent mandates. Where Congress has 
given them the room to adopt common approaches, they need to do so, both so that we reduce 
the change of risk shifting among institutions subject to their different jurisdictions, but also so 
that we improve the chances of promoting a uniform global approach that does not damage 
U.S. firms. 
Geithner, supra note 11. 
 28.  OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS GRP., REPORT ON AGREED UNDERSTANDINGS TO 
RESOLVING CROSS-BORDER CONFLICTS, INCONSISTENCIES, GAPS AND DUPLICATIVE 
REQUIREMENTS 1, (Mar. 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/ 
odrgreport.pdf. 
 29.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL, THE DANGER OF DIVERGENCE: TRANSATLANTIC FINANCIAL REFORM 
& THE G20 AGENDA, 29 (2013). 
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financial crisis so devastating was that these failures combined to facilitate the 
transmission of economic shocks.
30
 
Current CFTC Commissioner Scott O’Malia also addressed this inability of 
the international community to take a bird’s-eye view of the OTC derivatives 
market. In a keynote address on March 25, 2014, O’Malia highlighted that the 
“urgency for a holistic view of the financial markets, without borders, was 
underscored by how the financial crisis caught the world by surprise. Data that 
could have identified systemic risk was fragmented across regulators and 
nations.”31 
As a result of this clear inability to identify the significant risks presented by 
derivatives and cooperate in the regulation thereof prior to 2008, international 
organizations and standard-setting bodies immediately responded to the crisis 
by discussing the future of derivatives regulation and by coordinating responses. 
This international response was supported by individual states as it became 
apparent that domestic regulation alone would no longer sufficiently incubate a 
state from financial turmoil, especially in the derivatives context. Geithner’s 
remarks to the international financial community highlight this reaction among 
states: “Just as we have global minimum standards for bank capital—expressed 
in a tangible international agreement—we need global minimum standards for 
margins on uncleared derivatives trades. Without international consensus, the 
broader cause of central clearing will be undermined.”32 
This broad acceptance of international coordination paved the way for the 
G20’s quick response to the financial crisis. Founded in 1999 and considered the 
“‘premier’ organization for international economic cooperation, the Group of 
Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors . . . provides a forum 
for banking and finance ministers from . . . nineteen of the largest or fastest-
developing economies to meet,”33 with the European Union being the twentieth 
member. In 2008, President Obama and the other G20 leaders met in 
Washington, D.C. with the purposes of creating a framework to prevent future 
financial crises and establishing principles to guide financial regulatory reform.34 
This summit and others have been followed by G20 leaders sending these 
agreed-upon reforms to the appropriate national authority within their state. 
Moreover, in 2009, the G20 established the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 
order “to coordinate and promote implementation of the financial reforms, 
which typically involves standard-setting bodies developing international 
standards (for example, principles, policies, or guidance), followed by 
 
 30.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. L. 
REV. 815, 828 (2012). 
 31.  Scott O’Malia, Comm’r, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Keynote Address at the 
SWIFT Institute, the SWIFT’s Standards Forum, and the London School of Economics and Political 
Science Conference: The Future of Financial Standards (Mar. 25, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaomalia-34).  
 32.  Geithner, supra note 11. 
 33.  Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327, 357–58 (2010).  
 34.  GAO REPORT, supra note 9.  
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jurisdictions voluntarily adopting rules or policies consistent with such 
standards, either through legislation or regulations.”35 
At the 2009 G20 summit in Pittsburgh, the reform agenda centered on OTC 
derivatives, with the leaders agreeing: “[a]ll standardized OTC derivative 
contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where 
appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the 
latest.” And that “OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade 
repositories” and “[n]on-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher 
capital requirements.”36 
The agreement of the G20 leaders on core components of OTC derivatives 
reform marked a significant milestone. However, this early success has largely 
been marred by problems with implementation and the consequent 
discrepancies existing between member states’ derivatives regulatory regimes. 
First, although several jurisdictions, including the United States, have made 
progress in implementing the G20 reforms to OTC derivatives, according to a 
GAO report published in April 2014, most reforms have yet to be implemented 
in member states.37 This variation is notable; the report highlights that 
according to a September 2013 progress report, only the United States reported 
having rules at least partly in effect to implement the G20 reforms requiring 
derivatives to be centrally cleared, traded on organized trading platforms, and 
reported to trade repositories, while many other jurisdictions reported having rules in 
effect for only some of these reforms or adopted or proposed legislation to implement 
the reforms.
38
 
The lack of consistency in national OTC derivatives regulation legislation 
and the continued inability of many member states to fully implement these 
reforms in a timely manner demonstrate the limits of international 
organizations in single-handedly motivating states to take action with regard to 
derivatives reform. 
Despite the G20’s success in creating an international consensus in general 
OTC derivatives reform and regulation, several weaknesses highlight the need 
to shift focus from global policy setting to transgovernmental networks in which 
regulatory agencies take the reins away from G20 leaders and work together to 
actually produce the necessary legislation. First, as an international 
organization, the G20 lacks true enforcement mechanisms. Brummer notes this 
limitation, writing, “[T]he G-20 communiqués are not enforceable under 
international law. Instead, disciplinary mechanisms within the G-20 are largely 
reputational.”39 The same constraint applies to the FSB, which, despite being 
“tasked with ensuring coordination in regulation among the G20 members, has 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  GRP. OF TWENTY, LEADERS’ STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, 9 (Sept. 24–25 2009), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-G20/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders 
_statement_250909.pdf. 
 37.  GAO REPORT, supra note 9.  
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Brummer, supra note 33, at 359.  
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no powers to force the United States or other countries to row back on national 
reforms and relies on peer pressure for persuasion.”40 Second, regardless of the 
G20’s ability to successfully encourage the implementation of the standards 
agreed upon in the regulation of derivatives, slight deviations between national 
legislation can lead to devastating consequences, the most prominent of which 
is regulatory arbitrage. The necessary detail required for the harmonization of 
derivatives regulation cannot be achieved solely through standards- and 
principles-setting, even on a truly global level. 
In fact, in the most recent G20 communiqué, the G20 leaders themselves 
noted that communication between regulatory bodies within their states is 
critical for successful legislation, with a strong push for meaningful peer reviews 
of OTC derivatives reform.41 This renewed focus on transgovernmental 
regulatory cooperation, where the specific agencies communicate directly with 
each other in order to achieve increased harmonization, finds significant 
support. Bull discusses this growing emphasis on G20 peer reviews, noting that 
some academics view these as an important tool because they can be used to 
“help deepen commitment to the standards by domestic officials by holding 
member jurisdictions accountable not only to an international body but also to 
each other.”42 Again, these peer reviews face similar challenges to the 
international financial standards as they are not binding;43 however, in certain 
contexts this transgovernmental communication can lead to more meaningful 
results in truly harmonizing the regulation of derivatives. 
 These weaknesses highlight the need for strong transgovernmental 
networks, with national regulatory bodies communicating with each other 
directly, rather than indirectly through their leaders. The most notable and 
crucial transgovernmental network in the derivatives regulation is between the 
United States and the European Union. 
IV 
THE GROUP OF TWO: DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE DERIVATIVES 
REGULATORY REGIMES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
Both the United States and the European Union claim to have passed 
legislation that fulfills the G20’s agenda concerning the regulation of 
derivatives. The United States enacted the goals and policies set forth by the 
 
 40.  Huw Jones, Andy Bruce & David Evans, Update 1-FSB’s Carney Says to Crack Too-Big-to-
Fail Bank Barriers by Dec, REUTERS, (Mar. 31, 2014, 3:55 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/31/g20-fsb-carney-idUSL5N0MS4QV20140331.  
 41.  GRP. OF TWENTY, COMMUNIQUÉ: MEETING OF FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK 
GOVERNORS IN SYDNEY 2 (Feb. 22–23 2014) (“We commit to cooperate across jurisdictions with a 
renewed focus on timely and consistent implementation supported by meaningful peer reviews, 
including OTC derivatives reform.”). 
 42. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 48. 
 43.  Id. 
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G20 in Title VII of Dodd–Frank.44 Also known as the Wall Street Transparency 
and Accountability Act, “Title VII of Dodd–Frank focuses exclusively on 
remedying a host of problems surrounding the previously unregulated OTC 
derivatives products that wreaked havoc on major financial and insurance 
industry companies including Lehman Brothers and American International 
Group.”45 Title VII adopts a bifurcated regulatory structure, with the CFTC in 
charge of the regulation of swaps and participants in the swaps market, and with 
the SEC as the agency responsible for security swaps and market participants.46 
Two years later, the European Union promulgated the EMIR in order to set 
forth the policies agreed upon by the G20 leaders, and this legislation, along 
with European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) technical standards, 
contains “the thrust of the G20 agenda.”47 As Barnes notes, EMIR’s “primary 
function is to deliver Europe’s interpretation of the agreed G20 mandate agreed 
on 25 September 2009, to make over-the-counter . . . derivatives trading less 
systemically risky.”48 Moreover, in February 2014, the European Union’s 
Permanent Committee of Representatives approved both the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) and the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Regulation (MiFIR),49 legislative proposals that had been debated 
since 2011.50 Together, EMIR, MiFID II, and MiFIR set the framework for 
trading derivatives, and this “package of legislation governing derivatives 
regulation originated” from the G20 accord.51 
Although Title VII of Dodd–Frank, EMIR, MiFID II, and MiFIR all in fact 
comply with the standards agreed upon at the 2009 summit, the respective 
legislations of the United States and the European Union differ enough to 
change the behavior of actors in the derivatives market: 
A comparison of Title VII of Dodd–Frank and the relatively similar European Union 
proposal for OTC derivatives regulation, known as the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation . . . , reveals that even slight variations can have a significant 
effect on the risk for regulatory arbitrage and competitive imbalance for U.S. based 
financial institutions competing in the global marketplace.
52
 
In this part, this article first addresses several explanations for why 
 
 44.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 30. 
 45.  Weadon, supra note 14, at 250. 
 46.  Id. at 258. 
 47.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 30. 
 48.  Barnes, supra note 13. 
 49.  Jonathan Herbst & Hannah Meakin, MiFID II/MiFIR Series–Impact on Commodities and 
Commodity Derivatives Trading, Norton Rose Fulbright LLP (Mar. 20, 2014), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=88e9372d-c1bf-4259-b9f5-44c4c889d765. 
 50.  Id. (“[In] 2011 the European Commission published legislative proposals to amend MiFID by 
recasting it as a new Directive (MiFID II) and a new Regulation (MiFIR). The European Parliament 
and the Council of the EU (the Council) have been debating the text since then, taking into account the 
efforts of the financial services and wider industry to influence the direction of certain provisions.”). 
 51.  Ben Moshinsky, EU Searches for Meaning of Derivative as Rules Take Effect, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 25, 2014, 7:23 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-02-25/eu-searching-
for-the-meaning-of-derivative-as-rules-take-effect. 
 52.  Weadon, supra note 14, at 259–60. 
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variations arose in the respective regulatory regimes. It then elaborates on 
significant discrepancies between the United States’ and the European Union’s 
regulation of derivatives. Specifically, it highlights differences arising from the 
varying scopes of Dodd–Frank and EMIR, as well as ones stemming from each 
regime’s regulation and treatment of data relating to derivatives transactions. 
A. Understanding the Unintended Consequences: Divergences in 
Implementation 
In Professor Jonathan Wiener’s article on the future of international 
regulatory cooperation, which builds upon much of his previous work,53 he 
dismisses stereotypes dichotomizing the United States’ and the European 
Union’s regulatory regimes. Although Wiener acknowledges differences exist, 
he notes that “characterizations of U.S. and EU regulatory systems as sharply 
divergent, such as the notion of a precautionary Europe versus a reactive 
United States, are exaggerated. The reality of U.S. and EU risk regulation over 
the past four decades is overall average parity punctuated by occasional 
divergences.”54 This rings especially true in the context of derivatives regulation 
because the “European Union and the United States do showcase a high level 
of commonality in their approach toward derivatives regulation post crisis.”55 
Thus, the dissimilarities between the United States and the European Union in 
their regulation of derivatives are not the result of two regimes that came up 
with different answers to the same problems. Rather, the occasionally 
conflicting and divergent regulatory regimes resulted from slight variations in 
implementation. The Atlantic Council report stresses that these discrepancies 
are largely unintended, stating, “[D]espite shared regulatory objectives, 
significant areas of divergence are emerging in the implementation process—
differences that have the potential to create high costs for policymakers as well 
as market participants.”56 
Various factors explain the current gaps and conflicts between the United 
States’ and the European Union’s regulation of derivatives. First, the United 
States is a single nation, whereas the European Union must balance the 
competing interests of its member states. Because the regulatory bodies of the 
European Union garner their authority from member states, their methods of 
implementing reform differ significantly because, in some scenarios, these 
bodies feel specific discretion or implementation is more appropriately left to 
the national governments. In short, the European Union can regulate member 
 
 53.  See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the United States 
and Europe, 5 J. OF RISK RES. 317, 343 (2002) (“[E]ven as the US and Europe dispute who is more 
precautionary than the other, from a global viewpoint both the US and Europe are probably at the 
highly precautionary end of the spectrum compared to the rest of the world. The acrimony over 
precaution between the US and Europe may be driven less by real differences over regulatory 
philosophy than by a larger contest for great power leadership . . . .”).  
 54.  Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 7, at 114.  
 55.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL supra note 29, at 30. 
 56.  Id. 
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states through either regulations or directives. Regulations look like federal 
statutes and trump state law by “establish[ing] directly enforceable standards.”57 
They are very detailed and all of the provisions are binding, “immediately 
becom[ing] part of a national legal system.”58 A directive, however, is binding as 
to the result, but not on the courts in the member states.59 This leaves the means 
of achieving the required outcomes up to the states. 
This distinction is evidenced within the European Union’s own package of 
derivatives regulation, with MiFID II, a directive, and MiFIR, a regulation. The 
discretion granted by directives creates the potential for “gold plating,” in 
which member countries may impose even stricter guidelines than those 
imposed by the European Union. An area of derivatives regulation in which 
gold plating is permitted involves the oversight of clearinghouses by member 
countries, in which “EMIR provides for the regulation of clearinghouses a basic 
minimum set of standards that may be heightened (‘gold plated’), depending on 
the jurisdiction in the European Union where the clearinghouse is 
established.”60 This ability of member states to independently guide 
implementation in certain areas gives rise to conflicts within the European 
Union, discussed below with regard to the varying definitions of derivatives 
currently existing within the regime. 
Although derivatives are uniformly regulated across the United States, a 
similar issue arises due to the various agencies involved in the implementation 
of the G20 agenda. Former SEC Chairperson Mary Schapiro touched upon the 
need for domestic regulatory agencies to cooperate amongst themselves, 
stating, 
Domestically, the SEC is working closely with the CFTC, the Federal Reserve Board, 
and other federal prudential regulators, as required by the Dodd–Frank Act, to 
develop a coordinated approach to implementing the statutory provisions of Title VII 
to the extent practicable, while recognizing relevant differences in products, entities, 
and markets. Working closely domestically also helps our efforts internationally.61 
Disagreements among bodies or states within the domestic regulatory 
regime can create gaps in the regulation of derivatives between the European 
Union and the United States. The challenges faced by both the European 
Union and the United States in achieving coordination and consistency within 
 
 57.  See Paul M. Schwartz, The EU–U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1971–72 (2013) (noting directives “require member states to enact national 
legislation that reflect their principles”). 
 58.  Christopher Kuner, The European Commission’s Proposed Data Protection Regulation: A 
Copernican Revolution in European Data Protection Law, 11 Privacy & Security L. Rep. 215, 217 
(2012).  
 59.  See Schwartz, supra note 57 (noting directives “require member states to enact national 
legislation that reflect their principles”). 
 60.  Id. at 38. 
 61.  Financial Regulatory Reform: The International Context: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 112th Cong. 16–17 (June 16, 2011) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairperson, Sec. Exch. 
Comm’n) (speaking on the international implications of the Dodd–Frank Act, specifically regarding the 
regulation of OTC derivatives and foreign investor adviser registration), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/testimony/2011/ts061611mls.htm.  
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their own regulatory regimes highlight the need to take a more nuanced 
approach in implementing derivatives reform that goes beyond the mere 
mandates set forth by the G20. 
Moreover, timing has proven to be a significant issue, with the reforms 
agreed upon by the G20 often being passed in one regime before the other, 
which leads to regulatory arbitrage and uncertainty for many parties engaging 
in cross-border transactions. A recent Economist article discusses the struggling 
reform of derivatives regulation and highlights the significance of delays 
therein, writing, “Market fragmentation is a worry too. That is mainly because 
American regulators—notably the Commodities and Futures Trading 
Commission—have moved faster than their European opposite numbers. 
Whether and how European firms are to comply with their requirements 
remains unclear and controversial.”62 Although the United States has taken the 
lead in most areas of reform, which arguably works to the detriment of U.S. 
parties to derivatives transactions,63 there are parts of the G20 agenda that 
reached enactment in the European Union first. For example, with regard to 
dark pools,64 the United States “is still developing its regulations in some areas 
covered by MiFID, including for high-frequency trading. In others, such as 
position limits for commodity derivatives, it already has measures in place.”65 
Finally, policymakers in the two regimes seemingly approach derivatives 
from different angles, as commentators “suggest that US rules appear to favor a 
more ‘snapshot’ view of the market and the positions that dealers hold, whereas 
EU laws prefer to understand the transaction cycle of each swap.”66 Moreover, 
differences in the number and types of agencies leading the reform of 
derivatives regulation in the two regimes have also led to varying approaches in 
passing legislation, with the United States taking a largely bifurcated approach, 
separating tasks between the CFTC and SEC, whereas policymakers in the 
European Union “have taken a more piecemeal approach, with various pieces 
of legislation tackling different goals and objectives.”67 These inconsistencies 
 
 62.  Regulating Derivatives: Teething Problems, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 22, 2014, 14:50), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/01/regulating-
derivatives?zid=295&ah=0bca374e65f2354d553956ea65f756e0.  
 63.  See, e.g., Weadon, supra note 14, at 259 (“[T]he fact that the United States jumped ahead of 
other financial regulators in passing Title VII has created an environment in which differential 
regulatory standards in major international derivatives markets will prevail absent international 
harmonization of OTC derivatives regulation.”).  
 64.  Dark pools are lightly regulated venues for trading, mostly run by broker dealers, in which the 
order of trade is not disclosed and information regarding transactions is only published after the fact. 
Scott Patterson, ‘Dark Pools’ Face Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., (June 5, 2013, 9:55 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324069104578527361102049152. These dark pools are an 
alternative to exchange trading but are coming under increasing scrutiny due to a lack of transparency 
and regulation. Id. 
 65.  Jim Brunsden, EU Lawmakers Seal Deal on Financial Market Rules Overhaul, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 15, 2014, 10:09 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-15/eu-lawmakers-seal-
deal-on-financial-market-rules-overhaul.  
 66.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 35. 
 67.  Id. at 30. 
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regarding approach and areas of priority between the two regimes ultimately 
are reflected in the legislation, despite the fact that both regimes adhere to the 
standards agreed upon by the G20. 
This discrepancy in implementation of the G20 standards between the 
United States and European Union highlights the limits of the G20, as the 
Atlantic Council itself notes: “Importantly, these variations undermine a key 
goal of the G20 agenda, namely, the standardization of derivatives dealings to 
promote simplicity and a better understanding of the risks of trading these 
instruments.”68 The following analysis of the current legislation regarding the 
regulation of derivatives in the two jurisdictions thus demonstrates the need for 
increased regulatory cooperation and harmonization between the two regimes. 
B. Key Divergences in the Regulation of Derivatives between the United States 
and the European Union 
Before identifying the key differences between the legislation governing the 
regulation of derivatives in the United States and the European Union, a 
reiteration of the key proposals agreed upon by the G20 leaders will highlight 
the room for potential discrepancies in the resulting regulation of derivatives 
after domestic implementation. In a response to the financial crisis and the 
systemic risk posed by derivatives, the 
G20 policymakers have broadly committed to reducing these risks by: (i) mandating 
that standardized OTC derivative contracts be traded on electronic platforms and be 
subject to central clearing; (ii) increasing capital charges for trades that are not 
centrally cleared; (iii) requiring that all derivatives trades be reported to trade 
repositories; (iv) obliging market participants to keep adequate capital; and (v) 
stipulating detailed business conduct rules to protect derivative counterparties and 
end-users.
69
 
Despite the success of the G20 in coming to an agreement on the most 
effective methods of eliminating and controlling the risks posed by derivatives, 
the slightest variation in implementing the G20 agenda can lead to conflicting 
legislation, which in turn creates the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage.70 The 
following sections highlight several significant discrepancies between the 
United States and the European Union in their regulation of derivatives and 
their respective legislation-setting for the G20 standards. 
1. Scope 
According to the Atlantic Council report, the most significant variation 
between the respective directives, regulations, and legislation in the United 
States and the European Union is scope: “Despite the similarities in approach, 
 
 68.  Id. at 48. 
 69.  Id. at 29. 
 70.  See Ben Protess, Official Warns of ‘Regulatory Arbitrage’, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 28, 2011, 6:44 
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/c-f-t-c-official-warns-of-regulatory-arbitrage/ 
(“If financial regulators in the United States and Europe enact conflicting rules for the derivatives 
industry, banks and other financial firms will be free to skirt the new rules, Bart Chilton, a 
commissioner at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.”). 
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implementation of the clearing and trading mandate has the potential to result 
in divergences between the EU and the US regimes. By far the most visible 
difference has been with regards to scope.”71 
This varying scope is most evident in the extraterritorial nature of both 
regulatory frameworks,72 because the reach of their legislation is premised on 
different metrics and circumstances. Under Title VII, the legislation’s 
extraterritorial reach is provided under § 722(d), in which “non-U.S. persons 
will be regulated if: they have a direct and significant connection with activities 
in, or effect on, commerce of the U.S.; or they contravene such rules or 
regulations as may be prescribed under the Act, necessary or appropriate to 
prevent the evasion of the relevant provisions.”73 
The extraterritoriality of Title VII is extremely extensive74 and is one of the 
most striking aspects of the legislation;75 however, EMIR also includes a similar 
provision extending its regulatory regime beyond the borders of the European 
Union. EMIR, per Article 4,76 regulates OTC derivatives extraterritorially by 
applying to transactions “between two entities established in one or more third 
countries that would be subject to the clearing obligation if they were 
established in the Union, provided that the contract has a direct, substantial and 
foreseeable effect within the Union.”77 
Additionally, both regimes allow for substituted compliance in certain 
situations. However, the question of whether a local law is sufficient is 
determined on a case-by-case basis and left to the discretion of the respective 
agency. In the United States, the CFTC determines whether a foreign entity 
may solely abide by its local comparable regulatory requirements in place of 
adhering to U.S. regulations.78 In the European Union, ESMA is given the 
authority to decide “whether a non-EU entity’s local rules are compliant or not, 
 
 71.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 36. 
 72.  See Robert Dilwoth et al., Comparison of the Dodd Frank Act Title VII and the European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation, 17 MORRISON FOERSTER, (Jan. 28, 2014), http://media.mofo.com/ 
files/Uploads/Images/140128-Comparison-of-the-Dodd-Frank-Act-Title-VII.pdf (“Both regulatory 
frameworks exercise an extraterritorial reach, particularly for mandatory clearing of transactions.”).  
 73.  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 722(d), 111 P.L. 203, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1673 (2010). 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  See Weadon, supra note 14, at 267 (“Considering the distinct possibility for disparate 
substantive standards and implementation timelines for margin requirements, one of the most striking 
aspects of the prudential regulators’ proposed rules on margin requirements for non-cleared swaps is 
the extraterritorial reach of the requirements. The proposed rules apply to all swaps transactions of all 
non-U.S. subsidiaries and affiliates of any U.S. entity.”). 
 76.  It is worth noting that the European Union enacted Regulation (EU) No 285/2014 on 
February 13, 2014 in order to supplement Article 4(1)(a)(v) and to provide “regulatory technical 
standards on direct, substantial and foreseeable effect on contracts within the Union.” This text 
provides a more comprehensive explanation of what constitutes “direct, substantial and foreseeable 
effect within the Union.”  
 77.  Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 
on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, art. 4(1)(a)(v), 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 
17. 
 78.  Dilworth, supra note 72, at 20. 
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and if not the non-EU entity must abide by EMIR standards.”79 Thus, the 
arbitrariness of these determinations by both the CFTC and ESMA opens the 
door for even more discrepancies in extraterritorial reach of their respective 
legislations governing the regulation of derivatives. 
The extraterritoriality of both Title VII of Dodd–Frank and Article 4 of 
EMIR has resulted in overlapping regulatory regimes,80 with varying and 
inconsistent scopes that consequently create a complex regulatory web for end-
users. In addition, this complexity will likely have unintended consequences 
that undermine the G20 agenda because“[i]f the conflicting requirements of the 
CFTC proposed guidance and EMIR is left unresolved, separate clearinghouses 
will necessarily develop for swaps between E.U. counterparties and swaps 
between U.S. counterparties.”81 This separation would “reduc[e] netting 
opportunities for each class of swap and result[] in unnecessarily burdensome 
collateral requirements for market participants.”82 
Moreover, the specific transactions covered and exempted by each provision 
vary. The Atlantic Council provides an example of the differing extraterritorial 
scope of the United States’ and the European Union’s respective regimes, 
noting: 
[T]he European Union has not yet determined to what extent foreign exchange swaps 
are to be covered by EMIR. But in the United States, foreign exchange swaps enjoy a 
specific exemption from mandatory clearing requirements under the DFA and 
subsequent Treasury election (DFA, section 722(h)). Without alignment, these 
differences in scope can encourage firms to shift their FX derivatives business to the 
United States as a way to benefit from (potentially) lower compliance costs.83 
This example demonstrates the discrepancies in scope and the resulting 
ambiguity, and it highlights the need for increased regulatory cooperation 
between the respective agencies. 
In addition to the extraterritorial reach of each piece of legislation and the 
ambiguity of both regulatory regimes in extending that reach, the scope of the 
two regimes also differ in their levels of detail and complexity attributed to the 
various elements of derivatives regulation. 
Policymakers have made note of this fundamental discrepancy between the 
regulation of derivatives in the United States and the European Union, stating 
“the terminology used to define the scope of each regime differs in emphasis, 
and it remains to be seen how this divergence will impact future 
implementation . . . . While the vast majority of OTC instruments will be 
regulated by both regimes, differing definitions can encourage gaps.”84 A 
 
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Commission on Capital Markets Regulation, Letter on Resolution of Differences Between EU 
and US Clearinghouse Requirements, 1–2 (Jan. 28, 2013) (“[T]he CFTC would require a swap between 
a U.S. and an E.U. bank to be cleared by a CFTC-recognized clearinghouse, while EMIR would 
simultaneously require such a swap to be cleared by an ESMA-recognized clearinghouse.”). 
 81.  Id. at 2. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 32.  
 84.  Id.  
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consequence of this inconsistency in terminology is that parties can take 
advantage of these differences by renaming or restructuring trades in order to 
fall outside of the regulatory regime.85 
To understand the consequences of such discrepancy in terminology 
between the United States’ and the European Union’s regulatory regimes, one 
can look to the current experience within the European Union. According to 
ESMA Chairman Steven Maijoor, as of February 2014, “‘There is no single, 
commonly adopted definition of derivative or derivative contract in the 
European Union, thus preventing the convergent application’ of the reporting 
rules within the European Market Infrastructure Regulation.”86 As a result, 
countries within the European Union may use their own definitions until the 
Commission adopts a definition, leading to inconsistencies that will inevitably 
result in varying regulation of transactions. After all, a “derivative transaction 
in one country might be considered a simple spot trade in another.”87 
Another example of the varying scope of derivatives regulation between the 
United States and the European Union can be seen in an analysis of actors 
covered by the end-user exemptions of the respective regimes. A 2010 Clifford 
Chance and ISDA report noted that, despite significant commonalities, this 
difference in end-user exemptions is significant: the European Union’s regime is 
potentially less burdensome for end-users. In the US, the clearing obligation falls on 
everyone who trades an eligible contract. In the EU, the clearing obligation applies to 
financial counterparties when dealing with other financial counterparties and 
nonfinancial counterparties only become subject to the clearing obligation when their 
positions (excluding certain hedges) exceed a specified clearing threshold.88 
This divergence is a leading point of contention among corporate hedgers, 
who are attempting to persuade U.S. regulators to exempt their trades, as the 
European Union has done.89 
2. Data Sharing and Reporting 
An extremely important area of derivatives regulation requiring 
harmonization and improved cooperation is that of data sharing and reporting. 
Both Dodd–Frank90 and EMIR91 include international data-sharing provisions; 
 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Moshinsky, supra note 51. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  CLIFFORD CHANCE & INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, 
REGULATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS: A COMPARISON OF EU AND US INITIATIVES, 3 
(2010).  
 89.  Matt Cameron & Tom Newton, Pressure Grows for US to Copy EU’s CVA Exemption, RISK 
(Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.investmenteurope.net/other/pressure-grows-for-us-to-copy-eus-cva-
exemption/.  
 90.  Dodd–Frank added section 21 to the Commodity Exchange Act, which created an entity 
tasked with the functions of collecting and maintaining swap transaction data and information, and 
which is accessible to certain foreign regulators under specified circumstances. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n, CFTC Votes to Clarify Indemnification and Confidentiality Provisions in the Dodd–
Frank Act, (May 1, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6246-12. 
 91.  In Regulation (EU) No. 151/2013 of 19 December 2012, 2013 O.J. (L 52) 33, ESMA adopted 
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however, the lack of mutual recognition among the respective regulators 
highlights yet another gap in the G20 agenda. Although G20 leaders agreed 
upon an international data-sharing arrangement, a report produced for the G20 
in March of 2014 by the OTC Derivatives Regulators Group (ODRG) on 
Cross-Border Implementation Issues highlights the continuing inability of states 
to reach agreements on data sharing.92 
This limited effectiveness can be attributed to numerous factors, including 
varying data quality and accuracy as well as issues surrounding identification of 
derivatives products.93 Moreover, “[a]cross borders, some jurisdictions have 
been unable to share trade-reporting data with each other because of a host of 
secrecy and privacy laws.”94 In the ODRG report, the group’s members state 
their preference for regulators to have direct access to relevant data held in 
trade repositories in other states; however, the report notes that direct access is 
unlikely to be currently available in many circumstances.95 As a result, ODRG 
in fact stresses the necessity for transgovernmental networks—direct 
communication between the relevant regulatory agency of each country—in the 
effort to improve data sharing.96 
In addition to issues with sharing data between the United States and the 
European Union, the Atlantic Council report delineates key points of 
divergence between the two regimes with regard to data reporting, noting this 
inconsistency “relate[s] to differences in: (i) the scope of products covered by 
the reporting requirement; (ii) the data that must be provided; (iii) the timing of 
disclosure; and (iv) the depth and breadth of data publication by SDRs.”97 An 
analysis of the current data requirements illustrates that the European Union 
and the United States prioritize different aspects of disclosure. For example, 
“while the European Union demands deeper information on swaps trades, the 
United States is more demanding about timing.”98 The consequences of such a 
discrepancy are significant and can put significant pressure on parties to cross-
border transactions, who may have to comply with both regimes and 
consequently make more data available immediately in order to adhere to both 
 
Article 3, titled “Third country authorities,” which provides the following: “In relation to a relevant 
authority of a third country that has entered into an international agreement with the Union . . . a trade 
repository shall provide access to the data, taking account of the third country’s mandate and 
responsibilities and in line with the provisions of the relevant international agreement.”  
 92.  See OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS GRP., supra note 28, at 1.  
 93.  Neil Roland, CFTC to Seek Comment Next Week on Improving Derivatives Trade Reporting, 
O’Malia Says, MLEX MARKET INSIGHT (Mar. 12, 2014, 21:05), 
http://www.mlex.com/user/Login.aspx?PubID=513217.  
 94.  Id.  
 95.  OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS GROUP, REPORT OF THE OTC DERIVATIVES 
REGULATORS GROUP (ODRG) ON CROSS-BORDER IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 1 (Mar. 2014), 
https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/NewsEvents_nr_20140331_odrg-rpt-cross-border.htm. 
 96. Id.  (“ODRG members are discussing access issues on a bilateral basis and will continue to 
work to develop practical solutions to trade repository data access issues[,] as authorities in their 
respective jurisdictions implement arrangements for the sharing of data held in trade repositories.”) 
 97.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 34. 
 98.  Id. 
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the European Union’s and United States’ regimes, respectively.99 
Moreover, the derivatives regulation regimes in the United States and the 
European Union diverge in their allocation of reporting obligations. In this area 
of derivatives regulation, the European Union’s regime imposes a burden on 
more of the parties involved in a transaction, and these parties are subject to 
higher compliance standards than their counterparts in the United States. This 
difference is significant for end-users because 
EMIR imposes detailed reporting requirements for the life of the contract, including 
any changes that occur to its essential terms. In contrast to the practice in the United 
States, the reporting requirement falls on both counterparties, irrespective of whether 
their activities exceed the threshold. Though end-users can delegate reporting duties 
to a third party, such as a dealer or a prime broker, responsibility for compliance 
remains with the end-user and cannot be contracted or limited by the fact of 
delegation.100 
By placing the burden of reporting on more parties and not allowing these 
parties to delegate their responsibilities to third parties, the European Union’s 
reporting obligations are considerably more burdensome, both in terms of 
potential liability and the cost of compliance.101 
These discrepancies in data reporting under the United States’ and the 
European Union’s derivatives regulatory regimes, and the difficulty faced by 
their respective regulators to access each other’s data, illuminate the 
significance of transgovernmentalism in the regulation of derivatives. The 
intricacies of the information held by the trade repositories within each regime 
and the impediments imposed by domestic law protecting data require direct 
regulatory cooperation between states. Although the standards set forth by the 
G20 set goals for member states, such standards are, on their own, incapable of 
covering the loopholes that allowed for the financial crisis in the first place: the 
inability to aggregate information across borders in order to better coordinate 
regulation and monitor the derivatives market for potential systemic risks. 
In order to resolve such deficiencies in the current regulation of derivatives 
globally, “[b]ilateral and regional efforts should supplement international 
efforts at the G20 and FSB. The most important relationship should be the EU-
US regulatory relationship, and both jurisdictions should focus their efforts on 
achieving deep consensus with one another as they promote policies 
internationally.”102 These transgovernmental networks, especially those between 
the United States and the European Union, will further the international 
harmonization of derivatives regulation. This will consequently reduce the 
threat these financial transactions present to the global economy by preventing 
 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 44. 
 101.  Id. (The report notes that these potential costs of compliance are significant: “The EU regime 
does not allow end-users to escape liability for reporting even when they delegate reporting 
responsibilities to a third party. Thus, parties remain responsible for their own reporting. This implies 
that end-users must develop internal systems for monitoring transactions and for checking the veracity 
and accuracy of the reporting undertaken by third parties.”).  
 102.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 57. 
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the fragmentation of information so that regulators can better anticipate 
systemic risk. 
V 
CONSEQUENCES OF AN UNHARMONIZED REGULATORY REGIME OF 
DERIVATIVES: HIGHLIGHTING THE NEED FOR HARMONIZATION 
The global nature of derivatives and the financial innovation that 
accompanies these instruments make the derivatives market highly susceptible 
to regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, the resulting concentration of risk poses a 
threat not limited to those financial institutions required to adhere to a stricter 
regulatory regime. The current lack of international harmonization poses 
serious risks, especially for the United States, because there exists 
a very real possibility that the exploitation of “regulatory arbitrage” opportunities 
created by the first-mover position of the United States will: (1) place U.S.-based 
banks at a competitive disadvantage with their non-U.S. competitors; and (2) increase 
the global risk posed by OTC derivatives as origination and trading migrates to 
jurisdictions with less burdensome regulations.103 
Although the lack of harmonization between the United States and 
European Union regulatory regimes does immediately affect participants, 
because “[t]hese varying requirements and approaches create a challenging 
terrain for companies seeking to participate in the world’s vast derivatives 
markets,”104 the most significant threat resulting from divergences in regulation 
is a potential repeat of the 2008 financial crisis. As discussed in part III, multiple 
factors contributed to the global crisis, but a central cause was the inability of 
states and international organizations to coordinate the regulation of highly 
complex financial products internationally, and subsequently, to aggregate data 
that could help regulatory agencies better analyze the risks to the global 
economy. 
Unfortunately, the deficiencies that led to the financial crisis in 2008 remain 
largely unaddressed. Current “differences in international rules are leading to a 
culture that addresses compliance rather than addresses risk, in which 
international banks spent too much effort on ensuring they were compliant with 
regulators in different jurisdictions.”105 This emphasis on compliance with the 
multiple regulatory regimes arising in the aftermath of the crisis is likely to 
result in increased regulatory arbitrage, and this regulatory arbitrage 
consequently results in a concentration of risk, which makes the global 
economy more susceptible to systemic failure. The solution, therefore, is 
increased international regulatory cooperation and the ultimate harmonization 
of derivatives regulation. 
 
 103.  Weadon, supra note 14, at 251. 
 104.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 46. 
 105.  David Bannister, CFTC Calls for International Swaps Data Sharing Deal, BANKING TECH. 
(Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.bankingtech.com/211252/cftc-calls-for-international-swaps-data-sharing-
deal/. 
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This part, addresses the most troublesome and prevalent consequences of 
the current unharmonized state of derivatives regulation. The discrepancies 
between the United States’ and the European Union’s regulation of directives 
have resulted in an increased cost of compliance, duplicative regulations, 
inconsistent data on derivatives transactions, and uncertainty among users of 
cross-border derivatives. These effects are largely interrelated, and the majority 
will be addressed in the context of regulatory arbitrage and the resulting 
concentration of risk—two consequences that the harmonization of derivatives 
regulation would specifically eliminate. 
A. Regulatory Arbitrage: The Search for the Most Hospitable Regime 
Following the financial crisis of 2008, states and international organizations 
responded in typical fashion: by amplifying regulation. The increase in 
regulation of the derivatives market, described above, not only reformed the 
regulation of products already under the supervision of regulatory agencies, but 
also brought financial products and transactions previously conducted in the 
dark under the auspices of regulatory agencies. A resulting spike in the cost of 
compliance for many financial institutions ensued because a significant number 
of parties must comply with duplicative regimes due to the extraterritorial reach 
of Title VII and EMIR either due to uncertainty as to which regime’s regulation 
actually applies106 or because the parties truly fall under the scope of both 
regulatory regimes. The current uncertainty surrounding compliance 
significantly burdens parties to cross-border transactions. When “faced with the 
potential for dual regimes to apply, end-users might consider establishing 
processing systems that collect, collate, and organize data in accordance with 
two separate reporting regimes.”107 
Regardless of whether parties abide by multiple regimes as a result of 
uncertainty or duplicative regulatory regimes, the result for all parties to cross-
border transactions is an increased cost of compliance. This consequent rise in 
the cost of doing business means that parties will seek out jurisdictions with the 
most friendly compliance regimes in order to attain a competitive edge. This 
phenomenon, known as regulatory arbitrage, is particularly prevalent in the 
case of derivatives due to their sensitivity108 and global nature.109 
 
 106.  A recent Atlantic Council report highlights how prevalent this uncertainty is among end-users, 
especially in the cross-border context, by providing the following example:  
Take the case of a large, multinational auto manufacturer or coffee company that uses 
derivatives to hedge its risks in the foreign exchange, commodities, and interest rate markets. 
As an end-user, this company must first determine the legal regime that applies to its 
derivatives trades. This could be surprisingly complicated, especially if the company trades 
different types of derivatives through subsidiaries located in different jurisdictions as well as 
with counterparties situated outside of their home jurisdictions.  
ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 46–47.  
 107.  Id. at 44–45. 
 108.  See id. at 34–35. The report explains that, due to the sensitivity of OTC derivatives,  
parties may seek out ways to avoid the full weight of reporting- and data-publishing 
requirements. In such cases, parties may seek to book trades through the European Union, 
WHITE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2016  2:41 PM 
No. 4 2015] FROM THE GROUP OF TWENTY TO THE GROUP OF TWO 323 
CFTC Commissioner Chilton warned of the possibility of regulatory 
arbitrage resulting from inconsistencies between regulations in the United 
States and the European Union, stating, “Dodd–Frank loses its authority at the 
United States border, and if the European rules are weaker than the law, 
derivatives trading is likely to shift overseas.”110 Chilton’s predictions were 
realized: following the implementation of Dodd–Frank in the United States, 
parties to derivatives transactions immediately began to participate in 
regulatory arbitrage at the expense of U.S. corporations. 
In a recent article, Tom Osborn surveyed end-users in order to gather their 
opinions on recent reforms. A telling response that demonstrates the increase in 
regulatory arbitrage among parties came from a representative at the Scottish 
investment company Scottish Widows, who stated, 
We have no interest in being CFTC-registered, until we either have to or want to. 
Fortunately we don’t have any bodies in the US. But as the survey shows, who we deal 
with in Europe has become important—making sure you’re dealing with a bank’s 
European entity, not their US entity, for example. It’s modestly reduced the number 
of counterparties we can deal with.111 
According to Osborn’s article, this response to U.S. regulations of 
derivatives seems increasingly prevalent, with almost fifty percent of non-U.S. 
respondents admitting to actively avoiding U.S. counterparties and with others 
reporting that U.S. firms and U.S. affiliates of non-U.S. firms have been denied 
access to certain non-U.S. platforms.112 These effects of regulatory arbitrage are 
quickly felt, as evidenced by ISDA data in a Wall Street Journal article from 
March 2014, in which Andrew Ackerman noted, “Activity between European 
and U.S. dealers in euro-denominated interest-rate swaps fell to about 10% 
from an average of 25% following the implementation of CFTC’s swap trading 
rules in October . . . .”113 
The significant regulatory arbitrage parties engage in as a result of 
regulatory divergences demonstrates the need for the harmonization of 
derivatives regulatory regimes. This need for improved regulatory cooperation 
to counter regulatory arbitrage is stipulated in Senator Charles Schumer’s letter 
to Chairman Ben Bernanke, in which Senator Schumer urged the Chairman “to 
work closely with [his] international counterparts to ensure that they adopt as 
 
where at least for the moment, data is reported by T+1, and thus they benefit from delays in 
dissemination of the information. 
Id. 
 109.  See id. at 40 (“The global nature of OTC derivatives has led some end-users to seek 
competitive markets and tailored derivatives contracts outside of their home countries and 
currencies.”).  
 110.  Protess, supra note 70. 
 111.  Tom Osborn, Counting the Cost of Reform—ISDA End-User Survey, RISK (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2335033/counting-the-cost-of-reform-isda-end-user-survey. 
 112.  Dilworth, supra note 72, at 55.  
 113.  Katy Burne & Andrew Ackerman, CFTC Close to New Rules for European Swaps Trading, 
WALL ST. J., (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304688104579 
467680559144744.  
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rigorous a regulatory regime for the over-the-counter swaps markets . . . . 
Ideally, those rules would perfectly mirror the U.S. rules. This would minimize 
the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage by non-U.S. customers of U.S. 
entities.”114 
Senator Schumer’s letter focuses on the competitive disadvantage of U.S. 
corporations due to regulatory arbitrage and how this shift away from the 
United States poses a real threat to the U.S. economy.115 The most damaging 
effect of parties taking their derivatives transactions outside of the United 
States, however, is the resulting gap in the derivatives regulatory regime. The 
current lack of harmonization pushes these transactions into the most lenient 
jurisdictions or outside of the regulatory context entirely, impeding the 
effectiveness of regulatory bodies to aggregate data. As Professor Schwarcz 
notes: “Complexity is the main cause of financial information failure. . . . 
Regulatory arbitrage increases complexity as market participants take 
advantage of inconsistent regulatory regimes both within and across national 
borders.”116 
B. The Concentration of Risk 
The rising cost of compliance, due to both uncertainty and duplicative 
regimes, and the resulting regulatory arbitrage as companies seek a competitive 
advantage, have led to increased concentrations of risk. The pooling of risk is 
most notable in three specific areas: (1) those jurisdictions lagging behind in the 
implementation of the G20 agenda; (2) clearinghouses that can afford to comply 
with both the United States’ and the European Union’s regulatory regimes; 
and, (3) most controversially, those areas that evade oversight by regulatory 
regimes. 
As discussed above, derivatives transactions are becoming more 
concentrated in certain regimes over others. This trend is particularly evident in 
the United States since Title VII led the charge in the implementation of the 
G20 agenda. A specific example in the United States is the exemption of non-
U.S. swaps operations, which encourages U.S. financial companies to “shift the 
bulk of their swaps trading activity to more hospitable jurisdictions.”117 This shift 
is problematic as it may “result in the concentration of financial risk in 
jurisdictions with the most favorable regulatory regime as companies exploit the 
regulatory arbitrage opportunity presented by disparate regulations.”118 
 
 114.  Letter from Charles Schumer, U.S. Senator, et al., to Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, et al. (May 17, 2011), 
http://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/ny-lawmakers-urge-regulators-to-reconsider-
derivatives-rule-that-would-hurt-us-competitiveness. 
 115.   See Weadon, supra note 14, at 272 (“[I]t is clear that removing the attendant risks of 
regulatory arbitrage will be integral to the success of Title VII and the long-term health of the U.S. 
financial services industry and the U.S. economy as a whole.”). 
 116.  Schwarcz, supra note 30, at 818.  
 117.  Weadon, supra note 14, at 271. 
 118.  Id. 
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Although the current shift has been largely away from the United States, the 
European Union is also losing derivatives transactions as a result of regulatory 
arbitrage. The growing tendency of parties to seek jurisdictions outside of the 
reach of Title VII and EMIR will ultimately negatively impact both the ability 
of regulators to effectively regulate these transactions and the markets 
themselves, because “[w]hen end-users shift hedging activities to a single 
market, they can generate concentrations of risk in a single jurisdiction. This 
impacts liquidity and market competition, and it also increases the cost of 
capital.”119 Although the United States and the European Union still account for 
the majority of derivatives trades and transactions,120 this shift to more 
hospitable jurisdictions will only increase if harmonization between regulatory 
regimes is not reached, since emerging markets will strive to attract more 
business, and other players, such as China,121 will continue to attempt to assert 
themselves as financial leaders. 
In addition to this concentration of risks in certain hospitable jurisdictions, 
the discrepancies in regulatory regimes are also leading to a concentration in 
the number of clearinghouses that service cross-border swaps. Duplication 
raises costs for clearinghouses, which means that only those clearinghouses with 
the financial ability to comply with multiple regimes will be able to participate 
in the cross-border market, ultimately concentrating risk and potentially leading 
to an AIG-type situation in the future. Seen by G20 policymakers as the 
solution to many of the problems in the OTC derivatives market, 
clearinghouses are facing a surging volume of transactions.122 Although 
clearinghouses were not intended to eliminate all risk,123 rather, just to 
concentrate it into fragmented parts in order to prevent systemic risk, Professor 
Schwarcz notes this “standardization can backfire” because “Dodd–Frank’s 
clearinghouse requirement might inadvertently increase systemic risk by 
concentrating derivatives exposure at the clearinghouse level.”124 Derivatives 
specialist Wallace Turbeville also highlights this unintended consequence, 
noting that “[t]he fear is that we have not eliminated systemic risk, merely 
concentrated it.”125 As clearinghouses continue to grow in size and cover a 
growing percentage of transactions, they begin to present a similar 
concentration risk to AIG in the years leading up to the crisis. 
 
 119.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 43. 
 120.  Burne & Ackerman, supra note 113 (“Analysts and data providers have not provided figures 
showing how much of the $693 trillion global swaps market has migrated to Europe from the U.S., but 
observers said the swaps market is divided roughly with 40% in the U.S., another 40% in Europe and 
20% in Asia.”). 
 121.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 53 (“[T]he largest banking system in the world now 
resides in China, not in the United States or Europe.”). 
 122.  The Risk in Clearing-Houses: All Clear?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 7, 2012). 
 123.  Wallace C. Turbeville, Derivatives Clearinghouses in the Era of Financial Reform, THE 
ROOSEVELT INST., 2 (Oct. 24, 2010), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/sites/default/files/wp-
content/uploads/2010/12/derivatives_clearinghouses_in_the_era_of_financial_reform.pdf.  
 124.  Schwarcz, supra note 30, at 820.  
 125.  Turbeville, supra note 123, at 14.  
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Although clearinghouses that must abide by duplicative regulatory regimes 
arguably provide a higher level of overall protection—one regime’s regulation 
may be stricter and fill the gaps of the other—this duplication may “ultimately 
discourage some firms from using some clearing services. Furthermore, market 
participants might be incentivized to develop financial products that evade the 
clearing requirement.”126 The cost of compliance may push market participants 
to create products that evade clearinghouse services, which clearly undermines 
the original intent of G20 leaders in requiring the clearing of derivatives 
transactions. 
The most concerning consequence of these concentrations of risk in more 
hospitable jurisdictions, in larger clearinghouses providing cross-border 
services, and in areas that evade regulatory oversight is that they impede the 
ability of regulatory bodies to aggregate data and protect against future 
systemic risk. This divergence “exerts increased pressure on regulators to 
establish mechanisms to share data and to develop communication channels to 
alert others of risks accumulating in cross-border derivatives markets.”127 
All of the unintended consequences of the discrepancies between the 
regulatory regimes of the United States and European Union, such as increased 
costs of compliance, duplicative regimes, inconsistent data on derivatives 
transactions, uncertainty among users of cross-border derivatives, the shift of 
transactions to most hospitable jurisdictions, evasion of regulation, and 
concentration of risk, are interrelated. Together, they amount to an enormous 
threat to global financial stability and demonstrate the need for harmonization 
of derivatives regulation if the United States and the European Union hope to 
prevent a crisis similar to the one experienced in 2008. 
VI 
HARMONIZING THE REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES: IMPEDIMENTS TO 
REGULATORY COOPERATION AND THE PATH FORWARD 
Before the harmonization of derivatives regulation between the United 
States and the European Union can be achieved, their respective regulatory 
agencies must be aware of the impediments they face. This part makes note of 
difficulties that arise in coordinating uniform regulations of derivatives in the 
two regimes. Despite these challenges, it highlights the current progress of 
international regulators in cooperating with each other, both in the context of 
the relationship between the United States and the European Union as well as 
globally. Finally, it addresses arguments against the harmonization of 
derivatives regulation among jurisdictions, noting that these critiques should act 
as a caution and provide guidance to regulatory agencies in their bilateral 
communications. 
 
 126.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 39. 
 127.  Id. at 34. 
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A. Impediments to Harmonization 
The difficulties in coordinating the implementation of the G20 agenda 
among the member countries and the European Union demonstrate that, 
despite the extent to which certain regulatory bodies desire international 
cooperation, achieving this harmonization in practice can be extremely difficult. 
In their article on international regulatory cooperation (IRC) in this 
symposium, Professors Alemanno and Wiener highlight several of the factors 
that impede the ability of regulatory bodies to coordinate, including 
fears by some interest groups that IRC will mean harmonizing down (a race to the 
bottom), and fears by other interest groups that IRC will mean harmonizing up (a race 
to the top); restrictions on sharing information across countries or agencies; limited 
agency staff and resources; and pre-existing statutes, both substantive . . .  and 
procedural (regarding administrative procedures such as transparency, confidentiality, 
notice and comment, stakeholder input, executive review, and judicial review).
128
 
These constraints all damage the current attempt to harmonize the 
regulation of derivatives between the United States and the European Union. 
First, politicians and regulators looking to prevent a repeat of the 2008 financial 
crisis and regulate systemic risk fear that international regulatory cooperation 
in the areas of derivatives may lead to a race to the bottom. Although “for the 
most part American regulators, like their counterparts overseas, have stuck to 
their guns,”129 it is acknowledged that international cooperation does lean 
toward less stringent regulations. As the following statement by Treasury 
Secretary Jack Lew highlights, “We will not let the pursuit of international 
consistency force us to lower our standards.”130 
Wiener and Alemanno also listed constrained resources as an explanation 
for difficulties in achieving international regulatory cooperation, and U.S. 
derivatives regulators undoubtedly agree. In fact, this lack of funding and 
resources is a current focal point of the CFTC, which argues “that it needs more 
resources because its responsibilities have grown tremendously. It has written 
more than 60 rules over the past three years and the agency now oversees the 
vast swaps market, which was previously unregulated.”131 
Moreover, restrictions on sharing information across countries are a serious 
impediment in the context of derivatives regulation. This constraint is 
specifically daunting for regulators on either side of the Atlantic because of the 
meaningful substantive differences between the two regimes with regard to 
data: 
EU actions have focused on individuals’ rights of confidentiality, and emphasized a 
single framework across countries to protect personal data. US policy, by contrast, has 
been influenced by a focus on the rights of free speech and different national and state 
responsibilities, resulting in a multi-layered framework that emphasizes enforceable 
codes of conducts, disclosures, and opt-out rights in select sectors, including financial 
 
 128.  Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 7, at 13.  
 129.  Financial Fragmentation: Too Much of a Good Thing, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 12, 2013).  
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Chon, supra note 2. 
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services.
132
 
Thus, this divergence in the regulation of data and their different priorities 
regarding the protection of data makes the sharing of information between the 
United States and the European Union a current focal point in conversations 
between their respective regulatory agencies. According to Scott O’Malia, 
removing this impediment to harmonization is a top priority of the CFTC, as 
evidenced by his recent “call[ing] on counterparts in Brussels to focus on 
recognizing each other’s swaps data warehouses and develop a means to share 
trade information. He has asked that Europe and the US should harmonise the 
form and format of data being reported.”133 
Moreover, differences in procedure and the implementation of regulations 
between the United States and the European Union also pose challenges to 
harmonization, as discussed above. The bifurcated approach of the United 
States, separating the derivatives regulatory regime between the CFTC and 
SEC, influences the approaches of regulators and, consequently, affects the 
implementation of reform. Additionally, the use of both directives and 
regulations in the European Union is a significant and unique attribute of its 
regulatory regime, and the discretion given to member countries through 
directives leads to both technical and substantive differences in regulations 
within the European Union. 
B. The Common Path Forward for the United States and the European Union 
In order to counter these impediments to regulatory cooperation, on July 
11, 2013, the European Commission and the CFTC published a memo in which 
they agreed to reach a “Common Path Forward on Derivatives.”134 In this 
publication, European Commissioner Michael Barnier and CFTC Chairman 
Gary Gensler “acknowledged simultaneous application of EMIR/Title VII 
could lead to conflicts of law, inconsistencies and uncertainty.”135 In this 
agreement, the two leading regulators noted that a key step in achieving the 
desired harmonization is to provide deference to each other on a territorial 
basis,136 sharing the view that “jurisdictions and regulators should be able to 
defer to each other when it is justified by the quality of their respective 
regulation and enforcement regimes.”137 
Although this agreement acknowledges the vital importance of 
transgovernmental networks in the regulation of derivatives internationally and 
 
 132.  ATLANTIC COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 50. 
 133.  Philip Stafford, CFTC and Treasury Share Swaps Resources, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 25, 2014, 
8:28 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3387ecc6-b452-11e3-a09a-
00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2xwdZtAbL.  
 134.  Press Release, The European Commission and the CFTC Reach a Common Path Forward on 
Derivatives (July 11, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-682_en.htm?locale=en.  
 135.  Dilworth, supra note 72, at 20. 
 136.  Id. at 29.  
 137.  Press Release, The European Commission and the CFTC Reach a Common Path Forward on 
Derivatives, (July 11, 2013) (on file with the CFTC).  
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sets a significant precedent for other regulatory regimes to follow, the 
challenges discussed throughout this article demonstrate that much work still 
needs to be done by both the United States and the European Union in order to 
eliminate the consequences resulting from the current discrepancies in 
regulation. Unfortunately, substituted compliance and foreign recognition are 
not sufficient remedies in the derivatives context; instead, the regulatory 
agencies of the United States and the European Union need to pay extremely 
close attention to the nuances of their respective regulations and the potential 
unintended consequences of their implementation methods in order to achieve 
harmonization. 
C. Current Progress Internationally 
Although this note stresses that the need for international harmonization is 
particularly pressing in the U.S.–EU context due to the concentration of 
derivatives trading in these two regulatory regimes, this focus does not mean to 
downplay the ultimate call for the harmonization of derivatives regulation 
globally. Ultimately, effective regulation relies on a global network of 
regulatory agencies that operate on the same page, as Chilton notes, “Whether 
trading occurs in Hong Kong, London or New York, to the extent practical, 
there needs to be global regulatory harmonization. While important to ensure 
national interests, without appropriate harmonization of rules, a virtual 
regulatory race to the bottom could occur.”138 Although some argue that the 
G20 set the foundation for harmonization, true global harmonization can only 
be achieved through direct communication between regulatory agencies of the 
various regimes. Evidence of this type of bilateral regulatory cooperation does 
exist in transgovernmental networks other than that between the United States 
and the European Union. Patrick Pearson, the head of financial markets 
infrastructure at the European Commission, highlights the relative success of 
global derivatives regulation, stating, 
We talk to each other. There’s a group set up between regulators including Japan, the 
US and Europe, and it’s doing a good job—its first report is being published soon,” he 
said. “The group meets three or four times a year, and I’ve had weekly phone calls 
from them. I’m encouraged; I’ve never seen this level of cooperation between 
different global regulators before. We are ensuring rules around the world match up.139 
Pearson’s positive evaluation of current progress is not unfounded. The 
focus of the G20 and local regulators, however, still needs to shift away from the 
standards-based approach, which cannot on its own achieve harmonization, and 
needs to look instead towards improving the transgovernmental networks of 
different national regulatory agencies in order to iron out the creases in 
implementation that ultimately lend themselves to regulatory arbitrage and 
concentrations of risk. Professor Randall Korskzner from the University of 
Chicago Booth School of Business stresses this necessary shift in approach, 
 
 138.  Chilton, supra note 1.  
 139.  Bannister, supra note 105. 
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noting, “Global standards and approaches to regulation need to focus more on 
removing risk from the financial system rather than just compliance—but to do 
so international regulators will need to harmonise their efforts and embrace 
technology to a much greater degree.”140 
Moreover, G20 leaders and members of the ODRG are becoming 
increasingly aware of the limitations on their ability to harmonize derivatives 
regulations as international organizations. Significantly, recent summits in 
September141 and November142 of 2014 addressed the cross-border issues that 
require changes to domestic legislation and the need for increased bilateral 
negotiations among member states.143 This focus on transgovernmental 
networks is the necessary next phase of derivatives regulation. 
VII 
A LACK OF HARMONIZATION ON THE NEED FOR HARMONIZATION 
Despite the detrimental consequences resulting from discrepancies in 
derivatives regulation, there are still critics of the harmonization framework. 
These arguments against harmonization largely stem from three different 
theories. One belief, held by several academics and regulators, argues that 
harmonization will result in weaker regulations globally and, consequently, 
increased risk. Another line of reasoning finds harmonization impossible, and 
therefore, a wasteful pursuit. The third and least compelling line of reasoning, 
as evidenced throughout this note, is that the regulation of derivatives does not 
require uniformity.144 
Although harmonization is frequently not desirable,145 the qualities146 that 
 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  See REPORT OF THE OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS GROUP (ODRG) ON CROSS-BORDER 
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES supra note 96 (“For the September 2014 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors meeting, the ODRG will report to the G20 on further progress in resolving cross-
border implementation issues, including identification of any cross-border issues that cannot be 
resolved without legislative change.”). 
 142.  See id. (“For the November 2014 G20 Leaders Summit, the ODRG will report how it has 
addressed or intends to address the treatment of branches and affiliates and organised trading 
platforms and implementation of the trading commitment and a timetable for implementing these 
approaches.”). 
 143.  See, e.g., id.  
ODRG members agreed to continue bilateral negotiations of MOUs between regulators to 
take into account local specificities, while leaving flexibility for ad-hoc arrangements between 
regulators. It was agreed that the bilateral negotiations should consider appropriate 
involvement of the local authority, such as notification, regarding direct access to information 
of foreign registered entities in the supervisory context and on-site examinations. 
Id.  
 144. GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 48 (including the opinion of “an industry association [that] 
noted . . . international consistency does not require uniformity but an appropriate level of similarity, 
comparability and predictability of regulatory outcomes across jurisdictions”). 
 145.  Schlosser & Bull, supra note 22.  
 146.  See Raustiala, supra note 8, at 7 (listing the three key factors driving transgovernmentalism: 
“the expansion of domestic regulation, increased economic interdependence, and technological 
innovation”). 
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have led to transgovernmental networks and increased regulatory cooperation 
are explicitly evidenced in the derivatives context, making harmonization 
desirable. Recently, Benoit Coeure, a member of the European Central Bank’s 
governing board, explained why uniformity is in fact desirable in the context of 
international financial activities, noting “[i]f you have an idiosyncratic local 
legal environment, then market participants will find it safer just to play on 
their home turf because of the legal uncertainty that goes with international 
activities, and we’ll lose the benefit of international financial integration.”147 The 
other two main arguments against harmonization, however, provide insight into 
the challenges that confront the harmonization of regulation and provide 
regulatory agencies with important considerations when interacting in 
transgovernmental networks. 
A. Harmonization and the Possibility of Weakened Legislation 
The argument that harmonization of regulation internationally will result in 
weaker legislation and potentially concentrate risk is noteworthy in that it 
provides a warning for regulators currently working together to remove the 
inconsistencies in their respective legislation and regulatory regimes. A report 
by the OTC Derivative Regulators Group highlights this perspective, noting, 
“Two academics suggest that if jurisdictions face significant limitations in their 
ability to reach agreement, harmonization efforts might lead to agreement on 
only weak global standards.”148 Moreover, total harmonization could reduce the 
flexibility of regulators to respond to local differences that will inevitably arise 
among jurisdictions.149 This inability to respond flexibly to differences and the 
harmonization of the regulatory network also poses a threat in that it “could 
cause financial institutions to behave in the same way and unintentionally 
concentrate risk (for example, holding the same types of assets).”150 
B. Is Harmonization Possible? 
Another critique of the harmonization of derivatives regulation is that it 
simply cannot be done. According to some policymakers, “The global 
harmonization of all aspects of financial regulation cannot be achieved. Many 
elements of financial stability and customer-protection policy can be 
determined locally. Some competitive distortions and opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage will remain inevitable.”151 
These critiques of harmonization highlight potential impediments to and 
consequences of the harmonization of derivatives regulation; however, rather 
 
 147.  Financial Fragmentation: Too Much of a Good Thing, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 12, 2013).  
 148.  GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 47–48. 
 149.  See id. at 48 (noting that an academic interviewed for the article argued “harmonized 
regulations across all jurisdictions may provide a level playing field but could be problematic, in part by 
not providing jurisdictions flexibility to respond to their differences”). 
 150.  Id. at 48. 
 151.  Stephan, supra note 20, at 202.  
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than serving as discouragement, these perspectives should act as a warning to 
regulators in their current transgovernmental discussions. Harmonization 
should not come at the expense of the necessary level of regulation. Moreover, 
regulators in harmonizing their regulatory regimes need to pay close attention 
to the potential unintended consequences of standardized regulation in order to 
prevent potential concentration of risks that could result from financial 
institutions centering on, for example, certain products or only operating via 
specific cross-border clearinghouses. 
In order to effectively carry out the mandates of the Common Path 
Forward,152 regulators in the United States and the European Union should take 
pains to understand these critiques and the existing impediments to 
harmonization discussed above. As part IV demonstrates, achieving effective 
harmonization in the regulation of derivatives requires more than abidance to 
standards. Regulatory agencies must understand the nuanced differences in 
their respective regulatory regimes and search for the functional equivalents in 
procedure that will allow them to uniformly implement regulations that will 
prevent regulatory arbitrage and, to the best of their ability, the concentration 
of risk in order to prevent the threat of systemic risk that derivatives are wont 
to pose. 
VIII 
CONCLUSION 
The dark side of an increasingly global economy exposed itself in 2008 with 
the financial crisis. Overnight, governments and financial institutions became 
acutely aware of the repercussions of the same technological innovation that 
was praised for easing this globalization, and as a result, businessmen and 
regulators alike admitted the need to increase and improve regulation. This 
need for increased regulation was particularly noticeable in the derivatives 
market due to the widespread, global effects and rapid technological innovation 
of derivatives transactions and products, a deadly combination that makes 
derivatives particularly threatening to the global economy. The immediate 
response of the G20 allowed the international organization to successfully reach 
an international consensus on required reforms and pinpoint the standards that 
should rule derivatives in the future. However, the key to effective regulation of 
derivatives lies in the transgovernmental networks between the national 
regulatory agencies responsible for implementing reform. This shift from a 
global, standards-based approach to bilateral regulatory cooperation is critical 
in preventing another similar crisis in the future and for the effective oversight 
of the global derivatives market. As discussed throughout this note and 
exemplified in the analysis of the United States and European Union, slight 
divergences in domestic regulatory regimes lead to fragmented blocks of 
 
 152.  As discussed above in part IV.B, the Common Path Forward is the publication set forth by the 
CFTC and the European Commission in which the two regulators noted the need for harmonization.  
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information regarding derivatives transactions, in addition to regulatory 
arbitrage and the concentration of risk in hospitable jurisdictions and dark 
pools. 
Today’s most significant and influential transgovernmental network in the 
derivatives context is the one connecting the regulatory agencies of the United 
States and the European Union, the two regimes that account for the vast 
majority of derivatives transactions. The recent implementation of G20 
standards by the two regimes has highlighted the need for harmonization and 
increased communication between their respective agencies: slight variations in 
their regulatory regimes have led to unintended consequences that undermine 
the G20 standards and fail to eliminate the systemic risk posed by derivatives 
transactions. Although the Common Path Forward acknowledges this 
deficiency and demonstrates a commitment for increased regulatory 
cooperation, regulators in both the United States and the European Union 
need to understand the impediments to harmonization and the potential 
unintended consequences of their respective domestic legislation in order to 
effectively reach uniformity in their regulation of derivatives. 
Despite this note’s specific focus on achieving harmonization between the 
United States and the European Union, ultimately, regulatory agencies globally 
will need to find a uniform approach to the regulation of this market, as other 
regions, most notably Asia, garner a bigger portion of all derivatives 
transactions and become financial leaders alongside the United States and 
Europe. The threats of regulatory arbitrage and the concentration of risk, 
however, are most notable today as a consequence of the discrepancies between 
the regulation of derivations in the United States and European Union. Thus, 
current efforts looking to prevent the systemic risks and financial crises 
resulting from derivatives transactions must shift from the international, Group 
of Twenty context and instead focus on the bilateral regulatory cooperation of 
the Group of Two: the United States and the European Union. 
